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ABSTRACT

Of the many things Christopher Hitchens has been called—and there is no
shortage of epithets or com plim ents—one of the most consistent is a “public
intellectual.” Whether the term is thought apposite or wildly inaccurate (Hitchens is by
trade a print journalist), it demands investigation—not only as a way to grasp his work
but also as an opportunity to conceptualize the problems and possibilities inherent in
the term itself. From understanding what “public” the intellectual serves and how to
balance public persona concerns against intellectual ones, the recent currency of the
term “public intellectual” represents a major moment in the history of American
intellectual self-definition and self-reflection. W hat’s at issue in the “public
intellectual,” I want to argue, is a conflict between the professionalization of
knowledge and how that knowledge is produced and controlled within the centrifugal
cultural dynamics of an outwardly expanding intellectual labor market.
This essay, then, is an attempt to interrogate and to chronicle literature that has
addressed the public intellectual, and develop it further. Animated by the desire to
salvage the term from bargain-bin oblivion, this essay seeks to situate Hitchens—as a
public figure, a working “public intellectual,” and an exemplary case study—among
the complexity of issues he (implicitly) has raised: if public intellectuals even exist
and, if so, where they come from; if “public intellectuals” now constitute their own
marketplace, susceptible to commodification and the vicissitudes of celebrity culture;
and what it means to be, in the words of Hitchens himself, “against bullshit.” This
essay should be read as part of a process of characterizing the contours of publicintellectual work. In short, it aims for a developing dialogue rather than a definitive
delivery; it treats the public intellectual less as a diagnostic description than as a site of
continuing contention.
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Introduction: The Case of Christopher Hitchens

The problem with being a public intellectual is you get more and more public and less and less
intellectual. —Jean Bethke Elshtain1
. . . i n the third-world situation the intellectual is always in one way or another a political
intellectual. —Fredric Jameson2

One of the more illustrative stories about the public persona of Christopher Hitchens
contains many of the elements—talking-head face-off, establishment grandee, and a
whiz-bang comeback, all wrapped into a polarizing topic on cable television—that
have by now become so customary to political discussion, but at the time might have
even been considered novel. The story has Hitchens, on CNN during the Gulf War,
insisting that Charlton Heston, future president of the National Rifle Association, list
what countries border Iraq. After botching the answer, Heston admonished Hitchens to
stop “taking up valuable network time giving a high-school geography lesson.” Not
missing a beat, Hitchens shot back: “Oh, keep your hairpiece on.”3
Unexceptional by the standards of Hitchens’s normal repartee, that exchange is
nevertheless

significant because it locates

H itchens —intellectually

and

temperamentally, if not geographically—within the broader framework of publicized
debate in America, even if, or especially if, it’s made by an import. Born in
Portsmouth, England and educated at Balliol College, Oxford, where he received a

1 Cited in Richard Posner, Public Intellectuals: A Study o f D ecline (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2001), 167.
2 Fredric Jameson, “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” Social Text
(Autumn 1986), 74.
3 Taken from Rhys Southan, “Free Radical: An Interview with Christopher Hitchens,” Reason
(November 2001): http://reason.com/0111/fe.rs.free.shtml.
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degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Hitchens worked until 1981 for the
London Times, the New Statesman, the Evening Standard, and the Daily Express. In
1981, he emigrated to New York and, later, Washington D.C., where he now resides.
From 1982 to 2002, Hitchens wrote the “Minority Report” column for The Nation, and
today writes the “Fighting Words” column for Slate.com. He is also a contributing
editor to The Atlantic and Vanity Fair. Along with his innumerable television and
radio appearances over the years, he has been a visiting professor at the University of
California, Berkeley, the University of Pittsburgh, and the New School of Social
Research. Presently he also contributes, among others, to The Daily Mirror, Critical
Quarterly, Foreign Policy, Free Inquiry, Granta, Grand Street, The London Review o f
Books, H arper’s, The Los Angeles Times Book Review, New Left Review, Newsweek
International, The New York Observer, The New York Review o f Books, Dissent, The
Weekly Standard, and The Washington Post.
Aside from being prolific and seemingly omnipresent, Hitchens has worked to
bill himself as a known quantity: as an advocate of atheism (he notoriously said the
real “axis of evil” is “Christianity, Judaism, Islam”); of socialism (his sympathies are
decidedly leftist); and of contrarianism (one need only scan his output to glean the
importance he places upon “opposition”).4 Of the many things Hitchens has been

4 Even a sample of his book titles —along with his “Minority Report” and “Fighting Words”
columns—show how Hitchens has staked his career on “opposition”: A Long Short War: The
Postponed Liberation of Iraq (New York: Plume Books, 2003); Why Orwell Matters (New York:
Basic Books, 2002); Letters to a Young Contrarian (New York: Basic Books, 2001); The Trials of
Henry Kissinger (London: Verso, 2001); Unacknowledged Legislation: Writers in the Public
Sphere (London: Verso, 2000); No One Left To Lie To: The Triangulations o f William Jefferson
Clinton (London: Verso, 1999); The Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in Theory and Practice
(London: Verso, 1995); For the Sake o f Argument: Essays & Minority Reports (London: Verso,
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called—and there is no shortage of epithets or compliments—one of the most
consistent is a “public intellectual.”5 Whether the term is thought apposite or wildly
inaccurate (Hitchens is by trade a print journalist), it demands investigation—not only
as a way to grasp his work but also as an opportunity to conceptualize the problems
and possibilities inherent in the term itself. From understanding what “public” the
intellectual serves and how to balance public persona concerns against intellectual
concerns (with respect to the foregoing epigraph), the recent currency of the term
“public intellectual” represents a major moment in the history of American intellectual
self-definition and self-reflection. What’s at issue in the “public intellectual,” I want to
argue, is a conflict between the professionalization of knowledge and how that
knowledge is produced and controlled within the centrifugal cultural dynamics of an
outwardly expanding intellectual labor market.
This essay, then, is an attempt (while certainly not exhaustive) to interrogate
and to chronicle literature that has addressed the public intellectual, and develop it
further. Animated by the desire to salvage the public intellectual from bargain-bin
oblivion, this essay seeks to situate Hitchens—as a public figure, a working “public
intellectual,” and an exemplary case study—among the complexity of issues he

1993); Blood, Class and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux,
1990). The quotation is taken from Christopher Hitchens, “You ask the questions,” The
Independent (6 March 2002): http://news.independent.co.uk/people/profiles/storv.isp?storv=2712
83.
5 His behavior and distinctive tone have generated enough ire (from conservatives and liberals
alike) to constitute a subculture in its own right. His departure from The Nation, in particular,
caused a volume of liberal outrage. See http://www.counterpunch.org/mccarthv 1022.html: “Letter
to a Lying, Self-serving, Fat-assed, Chain-smoking, Drunken, Opportunistic, Cynical Contrarian
(AKA C. Hitchens).” Excepting “lying,” however, Hitchens would probably disagree with none of
the charges.
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(implicitly) has raised: if public intellectuals even exist and, if so, where they come
from; if “public intellectuals” now constitute their own marketplace, susceptible to
commodification and the vicissitudes of celebrity culture; and what it means to be
“oppositional,” both to what and for whom. This essay should be read as part of a
process of characterizing the contours of public-intellectual work. In short, it aims for
a developing dialogue rather than a definitive delivery; it treats the public intellectual
less as a diagnostic description than as a site of continuing contention.

Context and its Discontents

Although the term “public intellectual” is of recent vintage—it wasn’t officially
christened until the late 1980s—historians and theorists have long grappled with what
intellectuals are, where they operate, and what they should do with their time.6 In
1837, for example, Ralph Waldo Emerson famously delivered “The American
Scholar” to a captive audience at Cambridge, where he outlined the “office of the
scholar” whose duties were “to cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them
facts amidst appearances.” The scholar’s function, said Emerson, “is to resist the
vulgar prosperity that retrogrades ever to barbarism, by preserving and communicating

6 The amount of literature on these topics is miles wide and fathoms deep, encompassing
everything from Michel Foucault’s “specific” and Jean-Paul Sartre’s engage intellectuals to the ink
devoted to the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia and the Enlightenment example of
Benjamin Franklin. For recent introductions to the subject, see Ron Eyerman, Between Culture
and Politics: Intellectuals in Modern Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) and Bruce Robbins,
ed., Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics, Academics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1990), especially Stanley Aronowitz’s “On Intellectuals,” 3-56. To understand historically what
“intellectual” may not mean, see Richard Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American Life (New
York: Vintage Books, 1962).
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heroic sentiments, noble biographies, melodious verse, and the conclusions of
history.” As for the scholar’s lifestyle, Emerson urged him to be “free and brave. Free
even to the definition of freedom, ‘without any hindrance that does not arise out of his
own constitution.’”7 In a somewhat more ecumenical vein, the Italian Antonio
Gramsci argued that “each man ... carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is,
he is a ‘philosopher,’ an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception
of the world.” Thus Gramsci concluded that “all men are intellectuals, one could
therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals.” From there
he distinguished between “traditional” intellectuals, who serve “the immediate social
function of the professional category of the intellectuals,” and “organic” intellectuals,
who shape and direct the class constituency to which they belong. Gram sci’s
“organic” intellectuals, unlike the traditional sort, are not necessarily “given by the
man of letters, the philosopher, the artist.”8 They might, for instance, be factory
workers who organize a union. For his part, the British cultural critic Raymond
Williams embodied intellectual praxis, acting as an agent over his long career, in his
own words, “to make learning part of the process of social change itself.”9
Given the three previous formulations, juxtaposed as much for their dissimilar
authors as for their similar approaches, “public intellectual” would appear to be a leadpipe tautology. Discourses concerning intellectual endeavor have always incorporated
7 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Selected Essays, Lectures and Poems, ed. Robert D. Richardson, Jr. (New
York: Bantam, 1990), 92-94.
8 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 9.
9 Raymond Williams, “Adult Education and Social Change,” in What I Came To Say (London:
Hutchinson-Radius, 1989), 158. For a representative overview o f his work, see The Raymond
Williams Reader, ed. John Higgins (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001).
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considerations of the public and how to effect change in it. Indeed, as John Patrick
Diggins has written, one can look back—starting with the Founding Fathers—to find
that the “role of intellectual as a public figure has far deeper roots in American history,
so much so that one might suggest that in the beginning American history and the
American mind were inseparable.”10 Yet the rise of the modern university in the
twentieth century, coupled with the increase and variety of media outlets, have
conspired to create a wholly different grouping to intellectual work.11 What “public
intellectual” does signal—and the reason it has picked up colloquial currency over the
last decade—is a tension in how intellectuals produce, acquire, and communicate with
audiences. In fact, the very genesis of the term presum es that today’s
intellectuals—those, to take the jaundiced view, of cloistered academ ia—have
somehow abandoned the public. Interestingly, the “public intellectual” has failed to

10 John Patrick Diggins, “The Changing Role of the Public Intellectual in American History,” in
The Public Intellectual: Between Philosophy and P o litic s, eds. Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry
Weinberger, M. Richard Zinman, M. Richard (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2003), 92.
11 The rate at which the university expanded and then diversified is indeed startling. As Louis
Menand explains in his essay, “The Marketplace o f Ideas” (http://www.acls.org/op49.htm):
“Between 1945 and 1975, the number o f American undergraduates increased by almost five
hundred percent and the number of graduate students increased by nearly nine hundred percent. In
the 1960s alone enrollments more than doubled, from 3.5 million to just under 8 million; the
number of doctorates awarded each year tripled; and more faculty were hired than had been hired
in the entire 325-year history of American higher education to that point. At the height of the
expansion, between 1965 and 1972, new community college campuses were opening in the United
States at the rate of one every week.” As for today’s media environment, especially oVer the last
ten years, see David Foster Wallace, “Host,” The Atlantic (April 2005), 54: “Never before have
there been so many different national news sources—different now in both terms of medium and
ideology. Major newspapers from anywhere are available online; there are the broadcast networks
plus public TV, cable’s CNN, Fox News, CNBC, et al., print and Web magazines, Internet bulletin
boards, The Daily Show, e-mail newsletters, blogs. All this is well known; it’s part of the Media
Environment we live in.”
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make an impression in Britain, France or other European countries.12 As a particularly
American concept, Helen Small has said, “it reflects a predominantly American
anxiety about the viability of what may be called ‘the profession of thought’—a
concern that, in a society often thought of as peculiarly hostile to intellectual life, most
of those who might be expected to take responsibility for its cultivation seem, now in
the twenty-first century, to have withdrawn altogether from the public arena .... To
speak of the public intellectual would appear to be a defensive manifestation of that
self-consciousness: a deliberate decision to assert, in the face of perceived opposition,
not just the continuing serviceability of the word ‘intellectual,’ but to protest (too
much) that those to whom it is applicable, including perhaps oneself, have a role to
play in public life.”13
Nowhere was that anxiety more apparent than in January 2001, when The Nation
hosted a panel discussion in New York portentously titled “The Future of the Public
Intellectual.”14 The moderator of the forum, John Donatich, also the publisher of Basic
Books, prefaced the roundtable discussion with a battery of questions, some astride
generations-old black holes but most germane to pinpointing what a “public
intellectual” is:
How does [the public intellectual] reconcile itself with the venerable tradition of
Am erican anti-intellectualism ? What does a country built on headstrong
individualism and the myth o f self-reliance do with its people convinced that they
know best? How do we reconcile ambition and virtue, expertise and accessibility,
multicultural sensitivity and the urge toward unified theory? M ost important,
12 See “Introduction” in The Public Intellectual, ed. Helen Small (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
2002).
13 Ibid., 4.
14 The participants were: John Donatich; Russell Jacoby; Jean Bethke Elshtain; Stephen Carter;
Herbert Gans; Steven Johnson; and Christopher Hitchens.
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how do we reconcile the fact that disagreement is a main catalyst o f progress?
How do we battle the gravitation toward happy consensus that paralyzes our
national debate? A new generation o f public intellectuals waits to be mobilized.
What will it look like?15

Those questions, while panoptic in their focus, are especially remarkable, for they
try, among other things, to picture a future for something that’s never really had a
stable past. What past the “public intellectual” —loaded with hushed reverence,
larded with puffed-up nostalgia—has enjoyed from books and articles has mostly
been premised on what I ’d like to call the Doberman Directive: the vague
expectation that the public intellectual marks his or her territory as does a
doberman on a leash—that is, as often and as widely as it can. I use the Doberman
Directive neologism to articulate how public-intellectual discourse has avoided
explicating its own phenomenon. Very little has been done to limn the
characteristics of the public intellectual, besides quasi-Romantic notions of
solitude (or at least without institutional affiliation or support) and madness (in the
sense of prolific output) that usually elide over socio-economic factors,
educational background, or ideas as fundamental as intention and self-promotion.
In 1990, for instance, Thomas P. Hughes and Agatha C. Hughes edited a tome
adorned with the title, Lewis Mumford: Public Intellectual. In March 1995, the
Yale Law Journal ran a lengthy essay on Argentinean freedom-fighter Carlos
Santiago Nino, headlined “The Death of a Public Intellectual.” On June 29, 1998,
The Nation wrote a brief article entitled “Kazin: public intellectual,” on the death

15 From transcript o f panel discussion provided by The Nation (12 February 2001):
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010212&c=l&s=forum.
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of Alfred Kazin, who was, we are told, “the very model of a public intellectual.”
But we are never told exactly why these individuals were, or how they became,
“public intellectuals” ; instead, the term is employed through slogan and
catchphrase—writing “accessible” prose, constrained by nothing, and sanctioned
by constantly declaimed independence—to lionize their deceased subjects. It is the
rather abstract and ill-defined nature of the Doberman Directive that has led
Joseph Epstein to remark that he “cannot recall when I first heard or read the term
‘public intellectual,’ but I do recall disliking it straightway.”16
One finds the Doberman Directive latent if not explicit in much of the
public-intellectual discourse today. Cornel West, for example, in the widely read
The Future o f Race, polishes this nugget, half-defensively and half-promotionally:
The fundamental role o f the public intellectual—distinct from, yet building on,
the indispensable work of academics, experts, analysts, and pundits—is to create
and sustain high-quality public discourse addressing urgent public problems
which enlightens and energizes fellow citizens, prompting them to take public
action. This role requires a deep comm itm ent to the life o f the mind ...
Intellectual and political leadership is neither elitist nor populist; rather it is
democratic, in that each of us stands in a public space, without humiliation, to put
forward our best visions and views for the sake of the public interest.17

While West (rightly) conflates the public intellectual with a quality of “leadership,” he
does not indicate how such leadership can “create and sustain high-quality public
discourse.” He does seem to premise that leadership on simply interacting with the
public. Put alternatively, just by writing often for and communicating often with the
“public,” one automatically “enlightens and energizes,” and thus becomes a “public”
intellectual. W est’s idealized public intellectual combines a wide circumference of
16 Joseph Epstein, “Intellectuals—Public and Otherwise,” Commentary (May 2000).
17 Cornel West and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Future o f the Race (New York: Knopf, 1996), 71.
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knowledge and a frequency of public interaction to spotlight important or neglected
issues so the “public interest” may take “public action” (these two constructs of which
later sections will address).
It is fair to say that W est’s apologia—and those like his —amounts to an
overdetermined occupation whose very seriousness of task manifestly hopes to fell
what doubts anxiety has left standing. What West expects of public intellectuals would
seem to put them at risk of collapsing under the weight of their own aspirations. Such
an expectation-laden occupation may help explain why the concept of the “public
intellectual” was born out of crisis—it was, from the start, exalted inversely to the
degree that its decline was lam ented—and why constant crisis has attended its
development ever since. Here I want to map out some of the central historical and
theoretical underpinnings concerning the public intellectual, and then apply those
presumptions and preoccupations to Hitchens himself.

Like a Drawbridge Over the Public Moat?

Though it’s difficult to pin down the first utterance of the term, we can identify
the point after which it circulated widely. In 1987, Russell Jacoby introduced the
notion of the “public intellectual” in The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the
Age o f Academe. In those pages, Jacoby identifies what he sees as a singular
phenomenon of “last intellectuals” before the 1960s, treating the rise of the modern
university system in the last half of the twentieth century as the crucible during which

12

some intellectuals became “public” and others, by comparison, private.18 Jacoby
outlines the public intellectual as “an incorrigibly independent soul answering to no
one” who “contributes to public discussion” and is committed “not simply to a
professional or private domain but to a public world—and a public language, the
vernacular.”19 It was, then, Jacoby who originated the Doberman Directive, and fitting
his mold were scholars —whom I will label collectively the Old Public
Intellectuals —like Edmund Wilson, Lionel Trilling, Irving Howe, C. Wright Mills,
Alfred Kazin, Daniel Bell, and Lewis Mumford. They were nearly all bohemians, as
Jacoby relates, living in pre-gentrified Greenwich Village during the 1930s, 1940s and
1950s, moving like sharks from topic to topic, periodical to periodical, without
academic affiliation. They were, to Jacoby, self-sustaining and self-serving. They were
independent contractors attentive to the pulse of America.

18 For additional books on this era, see Steven Biel, Independent Intellectuals in the United States,
1910-1945 (New York: New York University Press, 1992); Harvey M. Teres, Renewing the Left:
Politics, Imagination, and the New York Intellectuals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996);
Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America 1889-1963: The Intellectual As a Social Type
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997); and Hilton Kramer, The Twilight o f the
Intellectuals: Culture and Politics in the Era of the Cold War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999).
19 Russell Jacoby, The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age o f Academe (New York:
Basic Books, 1987), 235; hereafter cited in the text. Jacoby’s tone and definitional parameters have
changed little since that publication. See also Dogmatic Wisdom: How the Culture Wars Divert
Education and Distract America (New York: Doubleday, 1994), especially “Journalists, Cynics
and Cheerleaders,” 160-191 and The End o f Utopia: Politics and Culture in an Age o f Apathy
(New York: Basic Books, 1999), especially “Intellectuals: From Utopia to Myopia,” 101-124. For
a similar, Jacoby-inflected analysis, see Eugene Goodheart, The Reign o f Ideology (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1997), especially “The Abandoned Legacy o f the New York
Intellectuals,” 82-98. For the flip side—how cultural politics have since affected the university
system — see Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher
Education (New York: Harper & Row, 1990).
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Taking Karl Mannheim’s idea of the “free-floating” intellectual quite literally,
Jacoby rhapsodizes about that era (and the luftmenschen of old) in a neat encapsulation
of generational exceptionalism, as though giants once walked the Earth. Since the
1960s, however, Jacoby claims that those cultural omnivores have been suckered by
universities, intoxicated by tenures, and seduced by specialization. In a nutshell,
Jacoby bends academia-at-large over his knee:
[T]he habitat, manners, and idiom o f intellectuals have been transformed within
the past fifty years. Younger intellectuals no longer need or want a larger public;
they are almost exclusively professors. Campuses are their home; colleagues
their audience; monographs and specialized journals their media. Unlike past
intellectuals they situate them selves within fields and d iscip lin es—for good
reason. Their jobs, advancement, and salaries depend on the evaluation o f
specialists and this dependence affects the issues broached and the language
employed (6).

Essentially, university life created a vacuum in which all the public intellectuals have
since been placed: “The generation born around and after 1940 emerged in a society
where the identity of universities and intellectual life was almost complete

The

missing intellectuals are lost in the universities” (16). Again and again, Jacoby returns
to this type of “missing intellectual” who “sought and prized a spare prose” and wrote
for a “public world” (7). Here Edmund Wilson and Lewis Mumford most closely
approximate Jacoby’s view of the ideal public intellectual, unaffiliated with the
university; later “fifties intellectuals” like Lionel Trilling and C. Wright Mills,
although they were professors at Columbia University, were still “publicists: they
wrote to and for the educated public” (26).
The real concern of Jacoby’s study, then, is that intellectuals write “to and for
the educated public,” whether equipped with university positions or not. Invented only
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in contradistinction to the “private” intellectual of academia, the “public intellectual”
implies that all intellectual endeavor until the expansion of higher education
functioned successfully, in the words of Jacoby himself, to “address a general and
educated audience” with “graceful prose” and “elegant and accessible essays directed
toward the wider intellectual community” (5, 17). The increasing danger to Jacoby is a
majority of “college teachers who lived conventional lives and thought conventional
thoughts” (73). Only with great difficulty could we compare the efficacy and
frequency of public interaction between Jacoby’s roving, pre-academicized intellectual
with those “conventional” college teachers who cooped up in colleges during the
1960s. Thus the university emerges as a confounding factor for Jacoby. On the one
hand, it becomes the marker for intellectual endeavor and, in doing so, absorbs his
prior generations of public intellectuals. On the other hand, as Jacoby even concedes,
the “newly opened and enlarged colleges allowed, if not compelled, intellectuals to
desert a precarious existence for stable careers. They exchanged the pressures of
deadlines and free-lance writing for the security of salaried teaching and pensions”
(14). Indeed, given the “industrial development and urban blight” that gentrified
Greenwich Village and contributed to the general decline of the bohemia that sheltered
Jacoby’s public intellectuals through the 1950s, the conditions which accompanied the
post-W orld W ar II expansion of higher education all but demanded the “stable
careers” of university life (7). And the place for the “incorrigibly independent soul”
who “contributes to public discussion” was no longer available as universities,
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corporations and governments specialized and academicized (creating more “stable”
locations to fill) the frontier of knowledge.
One cannot argue with the basics of Jacoby’s history. It is true that the
university, in a sense, kidnapped the “last intellectuals” Jacoby so exalts. But his
evidence is cumulative rather than substantiative: the Doberman Directive
pathologizes the ills of academia while not recognizing its own built-in nostalgia of a
bygone era. This nostalgia has blinded Jacoby to several important realities. The most
salient is that the Old Public Intellectuals were dependent on a particular social and
economic geography that, once dismantled by the growth of a university-state
complex, could not support “independent” intellectuals any more. The second is that,
as Andrew Ross has remarked, the academy constitutes “a massive public sphere in
itself, involving millions of people in this country alone, and so the idea that you break
out of the academy in the public is rather a nonsense.”20 And the third is that, despite
Jacoby’s visceral fear of the university, all of the intellectuals he names in his study
were educated and trained at universities: while the university may absorb publicintellectual endeavor, it is also crucial to the production of public intellectuals.
Part of the problem in evaluating whether public intellectuals still
exist—Jacoby would say they’re deader than disco—is that there is no real process of
accreditation and certification. Before the expansion of higher education, of course,
the importance of diplomas and institutional recognition mattered much less as a point
of intellectual signification. If, like Edmund Wilson, one wrote frequently on an array
20 Cited in Stanley Fish, Professional Correctness: Liteary Studies and Political Change (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995), 117.
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of subjects, then one could be considered, absent any other outside laurels, a public
intellectual (even if institutional recognition was initially needed for entry into public
intellectualdom). There was no axis of difference between “intellectual” and “public
intellectual” —every writer was, in a sense, “public.” How one “becomes” a public
intellectual has never been codified insofar as operating outside the academy and
writing often for different publications—in essence, the Doberman Directive—have
acted as markers of a public intellect. As Alan Wolfe writes in An Intellectual in
P ublic, his quasi-autobiography of 2003, “in the years in which [Wolfe was] an
intellectual in public—from the 1960s to the present—there have not been many
models to follow. During those years, the academic world engaged itself in forms of
professionalism so strictly defined that little room remained for those willing and able
to reach a larger audience with their view.” Moreover, the fact that Wolfe solicited
mass-circulating magazines for his output—mostly book reviews—rather than the
“scholarly journals” of cloistered academia anoints him de facto an “intellectual in
public.” Lest one, however, want to follow W olfe’s well-hewn path, we are warned,
by book’s conclusion, that “there can be no guidebook on how to become an
intellectual in public. There can be only the desire to make sense out of the world one
issue at a time.”21
If the problem then resides in a professional “guidebook,” one might turn to
Florida Atlantic U niversity’s recently established “doctoral program for public
intellectuals.” The program —otherwise named “the Ph.D. in Com parative
21 Alan Wolfe, An Intellectual in Public (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003), 1-3
and 380.
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Studies” —splits into two: the Public Intellectuals Program and the Program in
Literatures, Literacies & Linguistics. The goal of the former, according to its website,
is “to combine theoretical with concrete analysis, preparing students who are
theoretically confident and knowledgeable about the world they hope to understand ...
and change.” The areas of pedagogic inquiry—everything including “public policy,
mass media, literature, aesthetics, ethics, gender, culture and rhetoric,” and then
some—is avowedly interdisciplinary, but with a twist: it seeks to goose with a broad
social imperative students “whose work defines, shapes and influences public
issues.”22 In offering a “unique focus,” according to Dr. Teresa Brennan, the lead
designer of the program, the probative value here is less a vade mecum for public
intellectuals than a gesture toward a specialization of function apart from, yet attentive
to, other forms of intellectual labor like rote analysis or purebred punditry. So too does
the “unique focus” gesture toward a “change,” which, while nebulous in meaning, is
far removed from Jacoby’s Old Public Intellectuals, whose importance wasn’t so
much in serving or affecting the public (since it was already “educated”) as it was in
their ability to serve themselves without any entangling alliances. But as a move
toward institutionalization never before afforded to such an historically marginalized
and conceptually embryonic activity, Florida Atlantic’s degree begs some thorny
questions. Can a university matriculate a profession—for that, it appears, is its
objective—that has long, at least in Jacoby’s rendering, premised itself against

22 All information taken from http://www.publicintellectuals.fau.edu.
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credentialized academia? If so, does that undermine if not neutralize the public
intellectual’s ability to define, shape and influence public issues?
To be sure, applying the academy’s disciplinary structures and dimensions to
the public intellectual is a conflicting proposition. The nostalgia embedded in Jacoby’s
study is allergic to such credentializing—the Doberman Directive has never had any
method per se except to be perpetually “going public.” What Florida Atlantic’s
program does accomplish, if nothing else, is the creation and regulation of a profession
united by common teaching and purpose. By offering a well-rounded education on a
variety of topics that terminates with a degree, Florida Atlantic makes apparent that
“public intellectuals” have always been united by a corpus of coursework which
enabled their work in the first place. Contrary to Jacoby’s potted history, the public
intellectual was never an autodidact who sort of appeared out of the blue, like a moon
rock on your front porch; h e—and Jacoby’s public intellectuals are all m en—was
trained by a university system that could find its modern-day counterpart in Florida
Atlantic’s. If Jacoby’s indictment of the university system rests with its professional
absorption of public intellectuals, one must see Florida A tlantic’s program as
attempting to produce public intellectuals with professional qualifications that would
compensate for any reputed extinction. Indeed, as Ellen Willis has written, “the real
question ... is not whether public intellectuals belong in the academy, or whether the
univeristy can have a role in educating them, or whether they can contribute to the
vitality of graduate study. All of these propositions are true. The real question that
needs to be asked is: what role is the academy going to have in supporting the work of
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public intellectuals?”23 No more, then, can location be said to determine function: by
which I mean the collegiate institution can either sterilize or it can fortify one’s ability
to perform as a public intellectual.24 That is a rule that has always provided many
exceptions (beginning with Mills and Trilling), and it has invariably arrived at a
location-driven either/or impasse (if you’re in the ivory tower, you languish; if you’re
outside the moat, you thrive), all of which is deadly for intellectual theory and even
worse for everyday discussion. The issue is, then, not a matter of establishing a
drawbridge between the two. Rather, the issue is how to deploy public-intellectual
work within social and cultural realities that demand a professionalized specialization,
something which has initiated contention in its own right.

Packaged, Bow-tied, and Available for Comment

Since Jacoby’s post-mortem of public intellectuals, discussion has developed
that not only presumes public intellectuals exist but that there is a discrete and
identifiable market for them. In Public Intellectuals: A Study o f Decline, Richard
Posner argues for such a market composed mainly of “public academic intellectuals,”
who have, by virtue of their day jobs at universities, muscled out the “independent”

23 Ellen Willis, “Who Will Support the Intellectual’s Work?” The Minnesota Review (ns 50-51,
1999), 191.
24 See Anthony Grafton, “The Public Intellectual and the American University,” American Scholar
(Autumn 2001), 41-55.
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intellectuals prominent in Jacoby’s study.25 Even so, Posner’s idea of the public
intellectual is one of redundancy:
[T]he intellectual writes for the general public, or at least for a broader than
merely academic or specialist audience, on “public affairs” —on political matters
in the broadest sense o f the word, a sense that includes cultural matters when
they are viewed under the aspect of ideology, ethics, or politics (which may all be
the same thing)
The intellectual, so defined, is the public intellectual.26

If we audit this statement, we find nothing so much as the Doberman Directive
swaddled in personal concern for “public affairs.” Even so, recognizing the political
nature of public-intellectual work, Posner further says that “before there were
universities in which serious intellectual work was done, and even later when
universities were becoming important centers of the production of knowledge, no one
would have thought to draw a distinction between public (with reference to audience)
and nonpublic intellectual endeavor” (27).
And yet, Posner argues, a market has been created for them. The demand,
according to Posner, comes from population and governmental growth, extended
schooling for the average American, and “the vast expansion of the electronic media,
and in particular in the number of radio and television talk shows, with their insatiable
demand for expert commentary on matters of public concern” (26). This is the domain
of infotainment including programs like The Charlie Rose Show and Ted Koppel’s
Nightline as well as public radio and magazines like The New Republic and The New
Yorker. This m arket—“derived from the demand of the educated general public for
25 More than being fortified with academic positions, some colleges have actively urged—if not
demanded—that professors market themselves to gain visibility for their respective school. See, for
example, G. Jeffrey MacDonald, “Colleges push professors into media spotlight,” The Christian
Science Monitor (25 June 2004): http://www.csmonitor.eom/2004/0625/p 11 sO1-legn.html.
26 Posner, Public Intellectuals, 22-23; hereafter cited in the text.
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intellectual information” and facilitated by the media—is “awash” in a steady supply
of public intellectuals (67). The only shortage Posner sees is “of unaffiliated, and
specifically of nonacademic, public intellectuals” (68). Measured by an alchemical
combination of “media mentions, Web hits, and scholarly citations” (194) from 1995
to 2000, Posner’s market not only ranks the top 546 “public intellectuals,” but he
breaks down the “media mentions” pack (Henry Kissinger edges out Daniel Patrick
Moynihan with 12,570 “mentions”) as well as the “scholarly citations” group (here
Michel Foucault wins in a landslide with 13,238) (209, 212).27 He metes out
demographical information, too, most notably an 84/16 percentage split between
males and females.28 Many of the listed “public intellectuals” —from Timothy Leary to
H.L. Mencken—are deceased, and have been for quite some time.
Aside from imparting compiled statistical data, Posner’s main concern is
explaining the “decline” in his subtitle—in this case, of quality. Though the “market is
competitive in the superficial sense” —because of so much demand and supply—it
operates “without any rules or norms, legal or customary ... and, unlike some other
information markets, with little in the way of gatekeeping consumer intermediaries”
(75, 76). But the “chief culprit” to the quality problem “is the modern university. Its
rise has encouraged a professionalization and specialization of knowledge that,
together with the comfortable career that the university offers to people of outstanding

27 For good or ill, Hitchens is not numbered in either of the lists.
28 Though beyond the scope of this essay, it would be worth exploring why there is such a large
gender divide—and whether, in fact, it is true—and why, regardless of its factuality, the discourse
surrounding the public intellectual is almost invariably put in masculine terms (see especially the
later section, ‘“Against Bullshit’: The Vocational Practices of Christopher Hitchens”) or else
typically employs male case studies (this essay included).
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intellectual ability, have shrunk the ranks of the ‘independent’ intellectual. That is the
intellectual who, being unaffiliated with the university (or, today, a think tank)—an
outsider to the academic community—can range broadly over matters of public
concern unconstrained by the specialist’s attitude that a university career breeds”
(388).29 To Posner, then, the modern university has bred a cultural environment that
has generated academics who become “public” intellectuals in the sense that they
acquire celebrity through the media (which demands expertise and credentials), but
has not generated—in fact, has sidelined—authentic “freebooters [who] range across
different fields” (54). It is this kind of “freebooter” —here Posner discusses George
Orwell for a chapter—who, without the constraints of “specialization and
professionalization,” is most attuned to the “charismatic calling” of the public
intellectual: “It isn’t primarily a matter of being intelligent and well informed and
writing clearly, but of being able through force of rhetoric or the example of one’s life
... to make fresh, arresting, or heterodox ideas credible to the general, or at least the
educated, public” (85). Armed with communication skills, an entertainm ent
dimension, and authority, it is these charismatic public intellectuals—academic or
not—who most successfully blend the “celebrity and commitment” required to gain
and keep a public (46, 57).30

29 He continues: “Specialization of knowledge reduces the ability of academic intellectuals to
speak clearly to general public issues, of nonacademic intellectuals to get a public hearing, and of
the general educated public to understand arguments about public issues” (52).
30 He continues: “Often one will read an article by a public intellectual not to acquire information
on which to rely but to be entertained or amused or to be reassured about or reinforced in one’s
opinions. To the ends of entertainment and solidarity the quality of the public intellectual’s ideas
may be secondary to his ‘star’ quality or his rhetorical gifts” (52).
l ib r a r y
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There is, to be sure, a particular strain of careerism here absent from Jacoby’s
idealized Old Public Intellectuals, who became public intellectuals almost by accident.
Nonetheless, Posner’s Public Intellectuals is a major signpost on the road of the
public-intellectual debate. It recognizes a market that has integrated and valorized
intellectual endeavor (creating experts and professions) within a culture that has,
historically, ghettoized intellectuals in favor, to employ Neal Gabler’s phrase, of a
“republic of entertainment.”31 Gathered from the afterclap of book-tour promotion or
the aftertaste of stale talk-shows, Posner’s market suggests something inevitably
opportunistic but also culturally necessary. It suggests the idea of a talking-head
sermonizer as surely as it suggests a benign commissar of opinions adjudicating for
mass consumption. And the main job of the public intellectual—as if by punching in a
time-card, lunch pail in tow—is to publicize and organize those opinions. Perhaps less
introductory icebreaker than white-coated documentarian, the public intellectual’s
function, it would appear, is simply to attune us to the submerged parallels and
intersections that exist between and among bodies of texts and forms of culture. Myths
and symbols, historiography and biography, laws and figures—all are components of
the same clean-shaven doctrine which stakes out social bugaboos and cultural hang
ups as the stuff of the intellectual’s turf.
And yet, when Posner describes the “credence goods” of public intellectuals,
he is not only describing arguments and ideas that demand authority (meaning
academic credentials), but also the wholesale commodification of intellectual
31 See Neal Gabler, Life: The Movie: How Entertainment Conquered Reality (New York: Vintage
Books, 1998).

24

endeavor. Craving expert knowledge, the market Posner describes sustains intellectual
labor by demanding specialized bursts of knowledge that (academic) intellectuals are
more than happy to supply. Such commodification yields what Stanley Fish has called
“cameo intellectuals” —there equated with academic intellectuals—who “will only get
a call when the particular issues with which they are identified takes center-stage and
should that issue lose its sexiness, their media careers will be over.”32 Here Fish (like
Posner and Jacoby) maintains that fissure between the university and the public.
Jacoby had originally fingered academia in vitro as the prime suspect for the decline
of the public intellectual; Posner and Fish, under the auspices of Jacoby’s schematic,
have since applied Economics 101: those with institutionalized positions will, every
time, elbow away the freelancers. But whereas Jacoby considers “independence” a key
co m ponent

to

the

p u b lic -in te lle ctu al

m ake-up,

P osner

has

deem ed

“independence” —those “freebooters” like Orwell—irrelevant given the realities of
what the market today demands, even if it means a decline in quality.
Nevertheless, Posner’s public intellectual “obtains an audience by engaging
with some matter that has the public’s attention” (32). Similarly, Fish’s public
intellectual “is the public’s intellectual; that is, he or she is someone to whom the
public regularly looks for illumination on any number of (indeed all) issues.” The
public intellectual is “not someone who takes as his or her subject matters of public
concern—every law professor does that; a public intellectual is someone who takes as

32 Fish, Professional Correctness, 118.
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his or her subject matters of public concern, and has the public’s attention.”33 This
interpretive intercession by Fish is important, for it both clarifies the realities of
public-intellectual endeavor (one must, in this sense, be a “public figure” as well as
write on “matters of public concern”) and points to the occupational hazards that lurk
therein.
How one then gets the “public’s attention” —by being a public figure or
engaging a public issue, or both—is another issue altogether, and one that reveals the
problems of Posner’s public-intellectual “market.” By not differentiating between
dead and alive public intellectuals, Posner in fact hamstrings the public intellectual’s
function to speak on “some matter that has the public’s attention” —which, more often
than not, involves something current and pressing. While someone like Orwell can
speak from the grave on matters of literature and culture (and serve as a model for
aspiring public

intellectuals), he c a n ’t exactly explicate the necessary

particulars—unless, that is, the Soviet Union spontaneously reforms. Even then,
Orwell—who can hardly “want publicity both for its own sake and as advertising for
[his] books and public lectures” (61) —would be trading on his status as a “public
figure” far more than his intellectual ability to engage in such a matter. Likewise,
Posner’s market fails to truly take into account intellectual commitment and credibility
(“the example of one’s life”), two qualifications which variously trouble many of
those ranked, including Kissinger and Ezra Pound (who’s also long deceased). In
effect, then, Posner offers no lodestar for the intellectual except celebrity for

33 Ibid., 119.
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celebrity’s sake.34 His study is really descriptive rather than prescriptive. Even so, it is
probably fair to say at this point that selling oneself—promoting oneself in a way that
establishes “publicness” —is unavoidable.35 But how one acquires “publicness” and
commands the “public’s attention” are both central to the very meaning of the public
intellectual itself and questions to which I now turn.

Making Opposition Functional

In No Respect: Intellectuals & Popular Culture, Andrew Ross shows how
intellectuals (counting many of Jacoby’s sacrosanct luftmenschen) have increasingly
endeavored to monumentalize popular culture—the expressions and products of a
mass society—as an important site of our social construction.36 Their work explicitly
freighted popular culture with the weight of revelatory enlightenment and expressly
assented to an abiding faith in, and an enduring obligation to, the descriptive
examination of mass phenomena. As a reaction (in part) to culture industry critiques of
the Frankfurt School, popular culture studies was an approach both welcome and

34 See also Michael Berube, “Going Public,” The Washington P ost (7 July 2002): in response to
Posner’s book and his economics of measured celebrity, Berube says sarcastically, “A public
intellectual in 2002, apparently, is simply an intellectual who generates a lot of publicity.”
35 See Jeffrey J. Williams, “Spin Doctorates: From Public Intellectuals to Publicist Intellectuals,”
The Village Voice (7 November 1995).
36 See also Thomas Molnar, The Decline o f the Intellectual (New Rochelle: Arlington House,
1961), 278: “While the intellectual is called upon to perform the function of mediation between the
groups of the pluralistic society, he is also enjoined to justify the existing or emerging mass values.
... they are never denounced ultimately and irrevocably since they are signs and symbols of social
cohesion, o f the efficacy o f the democratic machinery o f education, press and mass
communication.” See also George Lipsitz, “Listening to Learn and Learning to Listen: Popular
Culture, Cultural Theory and American Studies,” in Locating American Studies: The Evolution of
a Discipline, ed. Lucy Maddox (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 310-334.
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warranted. The intellectual scale of ambition adjusted to decode the terrain of mass
culture, where concepts such as race, ethnicity, gender, and citizenship are constantly
negotiated and in flux. In this environment, though, as Ross concedes either by way of
ringing endorsement or resigned admission, it has obviated the need for “opposition”:
the mantle o f opposition no longer rests upon the shoulders o f an autonomous
avant-garde: neither the elite m etropolitan intellectuals who form ed the
traditional corpus o f public tastemakers or opinion-makers; nor the romantic neo
bohemians who shaped the heroic Nietzschean image o f the unattached dissenter,
committed to the lonely articulation o f social truths; nor the organic party cadres
whom Lenin shaped after the model o f the “professional revolutionary.”37

By the end of his study, Ross has described intellectuals so progressively
steeped in popular culture—having charted them from allies of the governmentally
demonized Rosenbergs to the gatekeepers of camp and pornography—that their
viability is contingent upon their engagement with—and, one might say, justification
o f—popular or mass culture. John Seabrook has otherwise called this “nobrow
culture,” where commercial culture, rather than what intellectuals define themselves
against, is a source of status and where cultural value constantly shifts under the halo
of “buzz.”38
In the context of public-intellectual work, such a “nobrow culture” highlights
the competing importance scholars have placed upon “opposition” —to governments
and institutions of power—as a modus operandi for cultural critique. Edward Said, for
instance, has said that the public intellectual is “someone whose place it is publicly to
raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than to
37 Andrew Ross, No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture (New York: Routledge, 1989),
210 .
38 See John Seabrook, Nobrow: The Culture o f Marketing, The Marketing o f Culture (New York:
Vintage, 2001).
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produce them), to be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or
corporations.”39 Michel Foucault has spoken of the intellectual’s role as “to question
over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people’s mental
habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to
reexamine rules and institutions.”40 Noam Chomsky positions intellectuals “to expose
the lies of government, to analyze actions according to their causes and motives and
often hidden intentions .... For a privileged minority, Western democracy provides the
leisure, the facilities and the training to seek the truth lying hidden beneath the veil of
distortion and misrepresentation, ideology, and class interest through which events of
current history are presented to us.”41 And Carl Boggs has sussed out the critical
intellectual, who is oppositional in “a counterhegemonic subversion of dominant belief
systems; the struggle for occupational autonomy and control of the workplace; a
critique of specific institutional practices and policies; rebellion against the norms and
routines of daily life; and the affirmation of new visions for the future.”42
In essence, each of the above approaches don’t engage the “public” as much as
they defiantly oppose it. The reasoning here speaks to a larger representational
crisis—how to advocate and for whom to advocate—in the public-intellectual debate,
all of which we can center around the notion of the “public sphere” as articulated by

39 Cited in Posner, Public Intellectuals, 30.
40 Michel Foucault, “The Concern for Truth,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and
Other Writings, 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), 255.
41 Noam Chomsky, American Power and The New Mandarins (New York: Vintage Books, 1967),
324.
42 Carl Boggs, Intellectuals and the Crisis o f Modernity (New York: State University Press of New
York, 1993), 162. See also Carl Boggs, The End o f Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of
the Public Sphere (New York: Guilford Press, 2000).
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Jurgen Habermas.43 Defined as a sort of liminal space, the “public sphere” —“the
sphere of private people come together as a public” —has since the eighteenth century
been eroded and reduced to “administered” conversation of “professional dialogues”:
“rational debate of private people becomes one of the production numbers ....
Discussion, now a business, becomes form alized.”44 For Habermas, the mass
m edia—television, radio, print, now the Internet—has not only supplanted our need
(and desire) to chew the critical fat (by presenting a salonish mock-up), it has also
boiled down the pool of available topics to crusty chestnuts. Rather than seeing mass
culture as participatory and multivalent, Habermas views it as repressive, an
“impersonal indulgence in stimulating relaxation than to a public use of reason.”45 In
other words, mass culture—at least in matters of public policy—tends to loop the
same story, sanitizing public opinion and marginalizing if not removing the disruptive
arguments of intellectuals. As Boggs writes, this is precisely where “in a social order
that dwells upon surface appearances and routinely depoliticizes public discourse,
radical insurgency [of critical intellectuals] is forced not only to articulate
counterhegemonic themes and possibilities but also to penetrate the dense world of

43 For criticisms and elaborations of Habermas, see Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public
Sphere (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992), especially Michael Shudson, “Was There Ever
a Public Sphere? If so, When? Reflections on the American Case,” 143-163 and Michael Warner,
“The Mass Subject and the Mass Subject,” 377-401. See also Bruce Robbins, ed., The Phantom
Public Sphere (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), especially Nancy
Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing
Democracy,” 1-32 and Stanley Aronowitz, “Is a Democracy Possible? The Decline of the Public in
the American Debate,” 75-92.
44 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category o f Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1991),
27, 164.
45 Ibid., 170.
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media manipulation. The time-honored purpose of critical intellectual activity is to
challenge, probe, confront and disrupt—that is, to constitute a vital ideological
counterforce to the power structure.”46
This conception of the public sphere—where the media and the government
collude to dispossess the “public” of political discourse and informed decision-making
capabilities—creates what W alter Lippmann has otherwise called (if a little
approvingly) “the phantom public.”47 Where the public intellectual is thought to then
stand—between public and pow er—is as a recuperative function of committed
criticism. In this case, the critical capacity of a public intellectual is directed in the
service of issues that most affect the public: the “power structures” that set policy. As
an index of public-intellectual work, such an oppositional stance has also thawed the
posterity enjoyed by the Old Public Intellectuals. As Michael Berube has argued in his
essay “Cultural Criticism and the Politics of Selling Out,” they might just be
considered plaster saints at best and negligent custodians at worst:
I want also to introduce into our discussions o f the “public intellectual” the
overdue recognition that the New York intellectuals were often the worst kind o f
armchair quarterbacks and fence-sitters, “activists” w hose only activism
consisted o f essays in D issent or Partisan Review. Time and again, when crucial
social issues were on the table, the N ew Yorkers elected to pass: and when it
cam e to taking stands on the Vietnam War, on school desegregation and
decentralization, on the W om en’s M ovem ent, many o f the so-called public
intellectuals o f the 1950s and 1960s compiled a deplorable record. (The New
York Review o f Books, for instance, largely opposed the women's movement but
was a strong antiwar voice; Irving Howe, meanwhile, declined to oppose the war
at all.)48

46 Boggs, Intellectuals and the Crisis of Modernity, 182.
47 See Walter Lippman, The Phantom Public (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1999)
and Public Opinion (New York: The Free Press, 1965).
48 Michael Berube, “Cultural Criticism and the Politics of Selling,” Electronic Book Review (19
Septem ber 2003):
www.electronicbookreview.com/v3/servlet/ebr?command=view essay&ess
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The idea that Berube pinpoints here is something beyond the Doberman
Directive. It requires not only frequent “public” interaction—writing often in
magazines, journals, and books (all of which most public intellectuals do)—but also
an active oppositional stance in pressing issues of the moment. This idea moves
beyond Alan W olfe’s book reviews and particularizes Cornel W est’s notion of
“addressing urgent public problems which enlightens and energizes fellow citizens.”
The assumption here, I think, is that by indexing bytes of information and strands of
thought, intellection is somehow spun into the episodic action which attends tangible
change—change, in some measured form, being the end-game of any publicintellectual enterprise.
And yet, as Stuart Hall has noted, “there is all the difference in the world
between understanding the politics of intellectual work and substituting intellectual
work for politics.”49 Put another way, to be an oppositional public intellectual does not
necessarily effect, much less resolve, knotted political problems. What we can say
about “oppositional thinking” is that its approach relies just as much on effort as
principle—that, given the public platform of celebrity, it behooves intellectuals to
intervene oppositionally as much as possible (rather than, say, offer expertise on
pornography). And by taking for granted that “public opinion” is either completely
wrong or inexorably manipulated, opposition not only guarantees the public
ay id=berubece. In a different form, this essay was also the keynote address at a conference on
“Western Humanities, Pedagogy, and the Public Sphere,” for the Fourth Annual Cultural Studies
Symposium at Kansas State University during March 9-11, 1995.
49 Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies and Its Theoretical Legacies,” in Cultural Studies, eds. Lawrence
Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula A. Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992), 286.
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intellectual continued “publicity” (by deviating from the norm) but it also attempts, in
its own way, to reinvigorate the public by opposing its opinion (which, as I ’ve
discussed, is really a composite of conventional wisdom and status quoism that is
ritualized and perpetuated by the mass media). It is in this respect public-intellectual
work hopes to have broad political effect by trying to generate a sense of a public
community.
We must also consider this issue of “opposition” as centering the very
particular kind of intellectual labor that “public intellectuals” are seen to provide.
Lionel Trilling famously put forward the notion of an “adversarial culture,” where
intellectuals operate as almost a separate critical stratum set against the cultural norms
of society.50 In The Future o f Intellectuals and the Rise o f the New Class, Alvin
Gouldner further developed this notion, in which professionalized critics inhabit a
“New Class as the paradigm of virtuous and legitimate authority, performing with
technical skill and with dedicated concern for society-at-large.”51 This is a world run
by experts and technocrats, who bear transformative values that will create what
Gouldner calls elsewhere a “culture of critical discourse.”52 In this way, intellectuals
becom e professionalized because knowledge becomes professionalized. The
problem—or advantage—with the New Class, as other scholars have remarked, is that
it entails a kind of embourgeoisement of cultural capital that institutionalizes

50 See “Preface” to Lionel Trilling, Beyond Culture: Essays on Literature and Learning (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1965).
51 Alvin Gouldner, The Future o f Intellectuals and the Rise o f the New C lass (New York:
Continuum, 1979), 19.
52 Alvin Gouldner, Against Fragmentation: The Origins o f Marxism and the Sociology of
Intellectuals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 30.
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knowledge as power.53 Here professionalized critics, who have historically operated on
the periphery of American culture, are installed as a class of moral oversight and
virtuous arbitration. By comparison, the importance placed upon opposition clearly
strives to resist being consolidated into the structures (and strictures) of power, and it
also explains the reluctance (starting with Jacoby) to professionalize the role of the
public intellectual. Without professionalized duties, the public intellectual can escape
a sort of ontological status—and a specialization of knowledge —that could
pigeonhole its function.
Even still, the issue of “opposition” reveals how crucial professionalization has
always been to public-intellectual work. While the decline in quantity and quality
variously described by Jacoby and Posner has been blamed on university politics or
economic markets, one might instead attribute those declines to a lack of a
professional apparatus that would prioritize the public intellectual’s function. To
separate and focus an oppositional function would mean, in a sense, to professionalize
the public intellectual. In doing so, the public intellectual would be professionalized
more by a specialization of function than a specialization of knowledge. Of course this
oppositional function would involve celebrity status, but the celebrity would be an
appendage to that professional obligation of opposition. It would also, at the same
time, resist the institutional problem of the New Class by decentralizing opposition,

53 See, for example, Alain G. Gagnon, “The Role of Intellectuals in Liberal Democracies: Political
Influence and Social Involvement,” in Intellectuals in Liberal Democracies: Political Influence
and Social Involvement, ed. Alain G. Gagnon (New York: Praeger, 1987), 8-11.
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not consolidating expertise, within the public sphere, thus ensuring vigorous public
debate that may prompt action.

“Against Bullshit”: The Vocational Practices of Christopher Hitchens

As a public figure and working journalist, Hitchens complicates many of the
presumptions and preoccupations of the public-intellectual debate. For one thing, he’s
independent—that is, he freelances for many different publications, operates outside
the academy very much like Edmund Wilson or Irving Howe and thus fulfills the basic
demands of the Doberman Directive. The architecture of Hitchens’s career, though he
was educated at a university, has never really included a university —while he
certainly shows the educational background common to most public intellectuals, he
has not used the university as an institution to support his work. On the surface,
Hitchens at once disproves that independent intellectuals are extinct (according to
Jacoby) and reaffirms that academic public intellectuals have cornered the publicintellectual market (according to Posner, Hitchens is among a dwindling breed). So
too has Hitchens confirmed that even the “freebooters” are susceptible to the lures of
the punditocracy (remember his vamping with Heston) and media celebrity culture: on
the cover of Letters to a Young Contrarian, for example, Hitchens wears a trench coat
and a bewhiskered scowl, while holding a cigarette as a puff of smoke corkscrews into
the air. It is a book cover, after all, but the level of postured affectation bespeaks a sort
of commodification—here, the book cover suggests, is someone bent on controversy
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(or else shadowy Cold War-era espionage) to the exclusion of all else—one would
expect only to befall “cameo intellectuals.”
Yet Hitchens has also gone to great lengths to define what qualities—both
intellectual and temperamental—must attend public-intellectual work. In fact, the
qualities Hitchens has introduced during his career represent one of the most
significant interventions to the public-intellectual debate, both elaborating and
problematizing the evolution of such an (un)profession. Amidst what Seabrook had
labeled “nobrow culture,” Hitchens has attempted to forge what I will call “vocational
opposition” as a litmus test for the public intellectual.54 To get a sense of what I mean
by his “vocational opposition,” I first offer a long quotation by Hitchens taken from
“The Future of the Public Intellectual” panel in New York:
I’ve increasingly becom e convinced that in order to be any kind o f a
public-intellectual commentator or combatant, one has to be unafraid o f the
charges of elitism. One has to have, actually, more and more contempt for public
opinion and for the way in which it’s constructed and aggregated, and polled and
played back and manufactured and manipulated. If only because all these
processes are actually undertaken by the elite and leave us all, finally, voting in
the passive voice and believing that w e’re using our own opinions or concepts
when in fact they have been imposed upon us.
N ow , to “consider the alternatives” might be a definition o f the critical
mind or the alive intelligence. That’s what the alive intelligence and the critical
mind exist to do: to consider, tease out and find alternatives. It’s a very striking
fact about the current degeneration o f language, that that very term, those very
words are used in order to prevent, to negate, consideration o f alternatives. So, be
aware. Fight it every day, when you read gunk in the paper, when you hear it
from your professors, from your teachers, from your pundits. Develop that kind
o f resistance.
54 I have derived the “vocational” part of this expression from Bruce Robbins, Secular Vocations:
Intellectuals, Professionalism, Culture (London: Verso, 1993), whose explanation of a “secular
vocation” is consonant with my meaning: “not an unearned sense of self-importance, not an
unquestioned or unaccountable authority, but that part of professional discourse which appeals to
(and helps refashion) public values in its effort to justify (and refashion) professional practice”
(25).
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I think it would be a very sad thing if the word “intellectual” lost its
sense that there was something basically malcontent, unsound and untrustworthy
about the person who was claiming the high honor o f the title. In politics, the
public is the agora, not the academy. The public elem ent is the struggle for
opinion. It’s certainly not the party system or any other form whereby loyalty can
be claimed o f you or you can be conscripted.
I would say that because the intellectual has some responsibility, so to
speak, for those who have no voice, that a very high task to adopt now would be
to set on eself and to attempt to set others, utterly and contem ptuously and
critically and furiously, against the now almost daily practice in the United States
o f human sacrifice. By which I mean, the sacrifice, the immolation of men and
wom en on death row in the system o f capital punishment. Something that has
becom e an international as w ell as a national disgrace. Something that shames
and besmirches the entire United States, something that is performed by the
professionalized elite in the name o f an assumed public opinion. In other words,
something that melds the worst of elitism and the absolute foulest o f populism.
People used to say, until quite recently, using the words o f Jimmy Porter
in Look Back in Anger, the play that gave us the patronizing term “angry young
man” —well, “there are no good, brave causes anymore.” There’s nothing really
worth witnessing or worth fighting for, or getting angry, or being boring, or being
humorless about. I disagree and am quite ready to be angry and boring and
humorless. These are exactly the sacrifices that I think ought to be exacted from
oneself. Let nobody say there are no great tasks and high issues to be confronted.
The real question will be whether we can spread the word so that arguments and
debates like this need not be held just in settings like these but would be the
common property o f anyone with an inquiring mind. And then, we would be able
to look at each other and ourselves and say, “W ell, then perhaps the intellectual is
no longer an elitist.”55

Here Hitchens calls attention to several issues that contrast sharply with
previous conceptualizations of the public intellectual given by Posner, West, and
Jacoby. Where Posner’s market features many dead “public intellectuals,” Hitchens
shows that concept to be oxymoronic. The “great tasks” for Hitchens are always
p re se n t ones that require, quite literally, an “alive intelligence.” And whereas
“opposition” figures nominally for West and Jacoby (“leadership” could be opposition
for W est; as for Jacoby, the word “opposition” hardly appears in The Last
55 Christopher Hitchens, “The Future of the Public Intellectual,” The Nation.
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Intellectuals), Hitchens foregrounds his conception of the public intellectual with
opposition (to “set oneself and to attempt to set others, utterly and contemptuously and
critically and furiously”) and with vocation (to speak “for those who have no voice” as
“the sacrifices that I think ought to be exacted from oneself’). This is where Hitchens
complicates the matter of opposition by showing it to be more a temperamental
prerequisite than a professional attribute. In an interview, for example, Hitchens said
that “the oppositional character, I am certain, is innate in some people. I ’m not sure if
it’s innate originally in all people and only manifest in some; I couldn't say. But I do
know for certain that it was innate in me, and that I seem to have found going through
life that I naturally meet other people who feel the same. It's very difficult to explain,
but you recognize the symptoms of a fellow sufferer when you encounter one.”56 And
in the dedication page of his hagiographic study, Why Orwell Matters, Hitchens tips
his hat to the Soviet Union historian Robert Conquest, “premature anti-fascist,
premature anti-Stalinist, poet and mentor, and founder of ‘the united front against
bullshit’.”57 In other words, while Florida Atlantic’s doctorate may gesture toward
professional regulation by board-certified study, it cannot necessarily teach the
“oppositional character” —very much an uncommodifiable quality—that directs the
knowledge gained from that program. If opposition indicates public-intellectual work
for Hitchens, it emerges as something that demands more than professionalization. It
demands a vocation.
56 Harry Kreisler, “A Dissenting Voice: A Conversation with Christopher Hitchens,”
Conversations with History (Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley):
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/Elberg/Hitchens/hitchens-con2.html.
57 See Christopher Hitchens, Why Orwell Matters (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
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Thus in Hitchens’s world, elitism is contrarian, it is malcontent, and it is
almost gladiatorial. It is, above all, oppositional to public opinion that is “constructed
and aggregated, and polled and played back and manufactured and manipulated” by
the “professionalized elite.” This attitudinal elitism against the “professionalized
elite” —here institutions of powers and the state—is more than mere criticism: it
considers “opposition,” again, less a professional qualification than a vocational
bearing with long-term goals. As such, Hitchens acts both elitist and populist: by
opposing “public opinion” formalized by the “professionalized elite,” he hopes to
invigorate the eroded public (sphere) and, as he said during the panel discussion, to
“spread the word so that arguments and debates like this need not be held just in
settings like these but would be the common property of anyone with an inquiring
mind. And then, we would be able to look at each other and ourselves and say, ‘Well,
then perhaps the intellectual is no longer an elitist.’” (In the context of critic
Christopher Lasch, Peter Augustine Lawler has called this “therapeutic elitism.”58)
Thus the public intellectual demands a oppositional capacity, or an attitudinal elitism,
to “public opinion” as well as a vocational commitment, or an aspirational populism,
to under-represented “publics” like death-row inmates.
Three of H itchens’s major books demonstrate how he has applied his
“oppositional character” to public opinion generated by the “professionalized elite.”59

58 See Peter Augustine Lawler, “Moral Realism Versus Therapeutic Elitism: Christopher Lasch’s
Populist Defense of American Character,” in Postmodernism Rightly Understood: The Return to
Realism in American Thought (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 157-178.
59 As books involve more sustained criticisms, I have elected to use them as examples. There are,
however, numerous articles that are similar in approach. See, for examples, Christopher Hitchens,
“The
D a la i
Lam a:
H is
M aterial
H ig h n e ss,” S a l o n (1 3
July
1998):

39

In his broadside of Mother Teresa in The Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in
Theory and Practice, Hitchens judges “Mother Teresa’s reputation by her actions and
words rather than the actions and words by her reputation.”60 He argues that Mother
Teresa is “a religious fundamentalist, a political operative, a primitive sermonizer, and
an accomplice of worldly secular powers,” as well as “the emissary of a very
determined and very politicized papacy” (56). According to the Hitchens, she treats
the poor not so much as people in need but as the instruments of her work in “a
fundamentalist religious campaign” and “on occasion for piety” (41). He continues:
“The decision not to [fund a proper hospital], and to run instead a haphazard and
cranky institution which would expose itself to litigation and protest were it run by
any branch of the medical profession, is a deliberate one. The point is not the honest
relief of suffering but the promulgation of a cult based on death and suffering and
subjection” (67). Without an oppositional agenda, one might argue, such a “cult”
might have never been investigated. After all, who would dare, as Hitchens writes in
the foreword, “to pick on a wizened, shriveled old lady, well-stricken in years, who
has consecrated her entire life to the needy and the destitute” (1) except someone
avocated to do so?
Witness also Hitchens’s apostasy during the Clinton/Lewinsky imbroglio.
Despite his leftist sympathies, he tackled the former president with the for-the-sake-ofargument brio characteristic of his type of public intellectual: “I thought at one point
http://www.salon.com/news/1998/07/13news.html and Christopher Hitchens, “Unfairenheit 9/11:
The Lies of Michael Moore,” Slate (21 June 2004): http://slate.msn.com/id/2102723.
60 Christopher Hitchens, The Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in Theory and Practice (London:
Verso, 1995), 24; hereafter cited in the text.
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that I might have to resign from [The Nation]. That was over, in general, its defense of
Bill Clinton in office, which I still think was a historic mistake made by left-liberals in
this country. It completely squandered the claim of a magazine like The Nation to be a
journal of opposition. By supporting Clinton, The Nation became a journal more or
less of the consensus.”61 In his book on the former president, No One Left To Lie To:
The Triangulations o f William Jefferson Clinton, Hitchens writes of Clinton’s use of
public money and tactics to intimidate people—mostly women with whom Clinton
had liaisoned—who might embarrass him. Hitchens also suggests Clinton launched
missiles into the Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq for the purpose of “distract[ing]
attention from his filthy lunge at a beret-wearing cupcake.”62 Conservatives and
Republicans, of course, were no stranger to character attacks, yet it was Hitchens’s
opposition that attempted to demonstrate how, as even conservative columnist David
Horowitz admitted, “this mattered to the policy issues the public cares deeply about
.... In making his own powerful case against Clinton, Hitchens has underscored how
Republicans botched the process by focusing on criminality that flowed from minor
abuses of pow er—the sexual harassment of Paula Jones and its Monica Lewinsky
subtext—while ignoring a major abuse that involved corrupting the presidency,
damaging the nation’s security and killing innocents abroad.”63 Triangulations was the

61 Southan, “Free Radical: An Interview with Christopher Hitchens,” Reason.
62 Christopher Hitchens, No One Left To Lie To: The Triangulations o f William Jefferson Clinton
(London: Verso, 1999), 87.
63 D avid H orow itz, “Hats o ff to a condemned m an,” S a l o n (1 March 1999):
http://www.salon.com/col/horo/1999/03/nc 01horo.html.
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essential work of the “vocationally opposition” public intellectual: railing against the
popular consensus with criticism steeped in public policy.
The last and latest of the three, The Trial o f Henry Kissinger, launches a
kitchen-sink blitzkrieg against President Nixon’s former secretary of state, accusing
him of “the deliberate mass killing of civilian populations in Indochina” and “the
personal suborning and planning of murder of a senior constitutional officer in a
democratic nation—C hile—with which the United State was not at war.”64 The
suggested rap sheet also includes Kissinger’s part in prolonging the Vietnam war and
other felonies in Bangladesh, Cyprus, East Timor and Washington, D.C. Failure, for
Hitchens, to issue a warrant for Kissinger’s trial “will constitute a double or triple
offense to justice. First, it will violate the essential and now uncontested principle that
even not the most powerful are above the law. Second, it will suggest that
prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity are reserved for losers, or for
minor despots in relatively negligible countries. This in turn will lead to the paltry
politicization of what could have been a noble process, and to the justifiable
suspicions of double standards.”65 With some notable exceptions, the charges Hitchens
levied were fairly new.66 By compiling them as an indictment for a trial, Hitchens in
effect spoke for those butchered in Chile, Bangladesh, Cyprus, East Timor and even
Washington, D.C.67

64 Christopher Hitchens, The Trial o f Henry Kissinger (London: Verso, 2001), x.
65 Ibid., xi.
66 See, for example, Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, The Arrogance o f Power: The Secret
World of Richard Nixon (New York: Penguin Books, 2000).
67 Says Hitchens (in Christopher Hitchens, “You ask the questions,” The Independent): “With
Kissinger, you can tell how many people he killed. With Mother Teresa, who only preached
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And yet, given what Hitchens has chosen to write about, one must ask what
effect this “vocational opposition” even has. Despite Hitchens’s calls for arrest, neither
Kissinger nor Clinton, much less Mother Teresa, have been to date hauled into The
Hague for prosecution. Effectiveness—or widespread popular adoption—is not
necessarily the point; the hope, I think, behind “vocational opposition” is not to have
immediate solutions (though that would be nice) but rather to show how good-faith
religion can turn bad and how bad-faith imperialism can turn worse. “Vocational
opposition” is very much a fe lt obligation to the problems which, caused by
government or institutional powers, affect (or have the potential to affect) a large
majority of people.
But as a member of the mass media, the oppositional function Hitchens has
sought to practice has necessitated the publicity he needs—or enjoys—in order to
acquire and maintain that function and the audiences for his work. Hitchens’s pose on
the cover of Contrarian—in fact, the way he usually comports himself —surely seeks
to maintain, as he said at the panel discussion on “The Future of the Public
Intellectual,” “something basically malcontent, unsound and untrustworthy about the
person who was claiming the high honor of the title [of intellectual].” No doubt
Hitchens markets him self—essentially, selling himself as product with expected
attributes and axes-to-grind—in an environment of increasing media specialization
and competitiveness. In this way, Hitchens shows that commodification is now
inevitable if not a necessary evil, whether one has credentials or not. Given his
surrender to poverty, disease and ignorance and against family planning, we can’t be sure of the
figures. But together they certainly make two out of the four pale riders of the Apocalypse.”
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previous statements and work output, I would argue, however, that Hitchens has
sought to make opposition and a commitment to it the index of the public intellectual
(its specialization, as it were) and any following publicity (or visibility) a by-product
(rather than a signifier) of the “public” designation. Put alternatively, opposition is
more than a pose—it is, for Hitchens, the practical essence of his vocation.

Conclusion: Between Obsolescence and Acceptance

It is often said that, as a subject, the public intellectual exceeds in always
inviting interpretation but resisting explanation. Invoked at a dinner party, reactions
run from knowing nods and furrowed brows to visceral hostility and guarded
suspicion, like turning your nose at something in the refrigerator that’s spoiled.
Because it has been continually used by academics, columnists, and critics alike to
take their own temperatures (and the temperatures of each other), its discussion usually
attends a frission of self-regard and a shakedown for a bottom-line answer: “Are
intellectuals doing enough for the public?” I would reply, simply, that this question
cannot be answered like some arithmetical equation—few can, for that matter.
One of the aims of this essay has been to describe and suggest the field of
accomplishment and system of recognition by which the concept of the public
intellectual has developed and how Hitchens has sought to demarcate and further
refine its purpose. This purpose, I hope to have shown, is not the result of mandarin
tastemakers spinning webs of their own significance; it is the result of an intellectual
taxonomy that attempts to prioritize authority within a constellation of competing
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critical fiefdoms. Questions of who speaks for whom and how one speaks are
proximate to the very notion of identity politics today. By no means does Hitchens
represent the ideal public intellectual, but he does emphasize that the cultural
formation of public intellectuals requires not only institutional training at universities
and professional regulation but also (at least in his case) a vocational commitment to
opposition. The “vocational opposition” Hitchens offers is more than knee-jerk
adversarianism: it is a production of knowledge based on a division of intellectual
labor that demands a specialization of function directed at public policy issues of
which popular opinion is often the most ignorant. That function, I have argued, would
signify the public intellectual less as a celebrity (though it certainly recognizes the
conspicuous level of performance endemic to this labor) than someone legitimated by
a sense of constituency with public debate that nourishes a healthy liberal democratic
society. Only by approaching the public intellectual from this angle, I think, can we
begin to reconcile and come to terms with a discourse that name-drops Christopher
Hitchens and Henry Kissinger in the same breath.
If there is a new challenge here, it is in developing a more textured history for
those who have mainly operated outside the print medium and asking if their
contributions, balanced against the pull of celebrity, pass muster as public-intellectual
work. After all, intellectual labor has always been strongly tied to writing, but that
shouldn’t stop us inquiring if, for example, Michael M oore—with his documentary
exposes on corporate America and the “war on terror” —is a bodement for future
public-intellectual cinema. One could argue that print, by its very nature, is less open
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to the criticisms of demagoguery that afflicted Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11, and is
therefore more capable of preserving a needed credibility. Then again, M oore’s
controversial status, as much as Hitchens’s, might indicate the lasting fate of public
intellectuals, always stranded between obsolescence and acceptance.
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